March 1, 2021
Volume 96.
By Bailie Mittman
Since the birth of the Bill of Rights in 1791, the freedoms protected by the First Amendment have been cherished by all members of this nation. The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” Over time, courts have acknowledged that the freedom to speak freely means very little if the guarantee is not protected by an additional right: the freedom to associate. Thus, the freedom of expressive association stands as an essential component of an individual’s free speech rights and state infringement on associative rights has the power of potentially chilling speech, especially from an organizational standpoint.
Throughout the relatively short history of the right to associate, the courts traditionally applied strict scrutiny to governmental attempts to intervene in organizations, whether such intervention be via imposing penalties on disfavored groups, requiring disclosure of membership groups, or attempting to interfere with a group’s internal organization or affairs. However, in two recent cases, Citizens United v. Schneiderman and Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Becerra, two different appellate courts found the freedom of expressive association of either organization was not infringed upon when applying intermediate, exacting scrutiny to state laws mandating the disclosure of nonprofit organizations’ annual Form 990s. These forms, filed yearly with the IRS to maintain tax-exempt status, include a Schedule B that contains a list of the names and addresses of all significant donors to the organization. The plaintiffs in both cases argued the forced disclosure of these donors would chill the organization’s freedom of speech rights by making it more difficult to secure donations from individuals who feared being publicly associated with organizations promoting various minority viewpoints. Ultimately, both appellate courts found these arguments to be unpersuasive and upheld the state laws.
February 20, 2021
Volume 96
By: Katelyn K. Leveque
The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) have long addressed conflicts of interest, with fluctuating degrees of stringency.1 For as long as the rules have been in place, legal scholars have grappled with how lawyers can work within the confines of the rules to serve their clients best, as well as how the rules might better align with what clients seek and expect from their legal representation. In their current form, the Model Rules address conflicts of interest in Rule 1.7. However, both this rule and the Model Rules more generally are not one size fits all. The Model Rules were written largely with litigators in mind, and thus applying them to transactional matters is often awkward and tenuous.2 In this Note, I will argue that Model Rule 1.7 should be amended to account for the differences in the ways that litigators and transactional attorneys should and do conceptualize conflicts of interest in their practices. Part I outlines the history of Rule 1.7 and its predecessors, and walks through Rule 1.7 and the comments as they exist today. Part II details the reasons that legal scholars argue Rule 1.7 is a valuable and necessary rule. Part III describes the incongruities between Rule 1.7’s parameters and the realities of transactional lawyering. Part IV discusses solutions that have been put forward to make up for the drawbacks of Rule 1.7 in its current iteration. Finally, Part V offers my proposed solution to the problem of applying Rule 1.7 to transactional matters: amend the rule and create subparts that pertain specifically to transactional lawyers, who have less need for a ban on conflicts of interest.
August 13, 2020
Volume 96
Betsy J. Grey & Samantha Orwoll
The Covid-19 pandemic set off a public health emergency that quickly brought doctors and other health care providers to the front line, while shuttering businesses throughout the United States. In response to the emergency, the federal and state governments rapidly created broad protections from tort liability for health care providers. To encourage businesses to reopen, some states have also provided liability protection for businesses from personal injury suits brought by patrons and employees. Congress is considering similar protections for businesses as it contemplates further aid packages. Some industries, like nursing homes and universities, are lobbying for specific immunity. This Essay overviews some of these liability shields, examines their relative necessity and value, and anticipates some of the issues that will inevitably arise as the provisions are implemented.
July 16, 2020
Volume 96
Peter H. Huang & Debra S. Austin
The decision to educate our students via in-person or online learning environments while COVID-19 is unrestrained is a false choice, when the clear path to achieve our chief objective safely, the education of our students, can be done online. Our decision-making should be guided by the overriding principle that people matter more than money. We recognize that lost tuition revenue if students delay or defer education is an institutional concern, but we posit that many students and parents would prefer a safer online alternative to riskier in-person options, especially as we get closer to fall, and American death tolls rise. This Article argues the extra stress of trying to maintain safety from infection with a return to campus will make teaching and learning less effective. While high density classrooms promote virus transmission and potentially super-spreader events, we can take the lessons we learned during the spring and provide courses without the stressors of spreading the virus. We argue the socially responsible decision is to deliver compassionate, healthy, and first-rate online pedagogy, and we offer a vision of how to move forward into this brave new world.
June 7, 2020
Volume 96
Sam Heavenrich
District courts have issued an unprecedented number of nationwide injunctions during the Obama and Trump administrations, provoking criticism from the Supreme Court. This Article proposes a change to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that addresses the Justices’ concerns without taking the drastic step of eliminating nationwide injunctions entirely. Specifically, this Article recommends amending Rule 65 to allow only the appellate courts to issue injunctive relief that extends beyond the plaintiffs in cases challenging a federal law or policy. In addition to the proposed Rule change, this Article offers a categorization framework for existing proposals addressing nationwide injunctions, classifying them as “Prohibitory Rules,” “Inhibitory Standards,” or “Inhibitory Rules.” The proposal itself takes the form of an Inhibitory Rule.