April 9, 2024
Volume 99
George Glass
In their first year of law school, students are introduced to four theories that attempt to justify punishing people who commit crimes—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. These “four horsemen of the carceral state” have led to the ballooning mass incarceration our country faces today. However, these four justifications are not written in stone. In fact, evidence suggests that each of the four justifications fails to effectively address criminal activity. This Note explores the current state of criminal legal education, addresses the shortcomings of each of the four justifications, and proposes a new criminal response framework that builds off the old justifications and incorporates prison abolition concepts. That new framework is built on non-punishment, retributive punishment, preventive justice, and holistic rehabilitation.
February 23, 2024
Volume 99
William Casto
This little Essay presents a framework for teaching the Erie Doctrine. It is not a grand analysis of the federal courts’ puzzle. It does not even offer a wondrously insightful vision of one of the puzzle’s colorful pieces. Rather, the purpose is quite modest. The essay simply aims to help students to organize their thoughts about whether a particular legal issue is governed by state or federal law. Given the Essay’s limited and wholly heuristic purpose, the usual endless parade of all possible cases and the careful rehearsal of exquisite and finely-tuned factors and considerations are eschewed.
February 19, 2024
Volume 99
Mehtab Khan
Automated tools used in online speech governance are prone to errors on a large- scale yet widely used. Legal and policy responses have largely focused on case-by- case evaluations of these errors, instead of an examination of the development process of the tools. Moreover, information on the internet is no longer simply generated by users, but also by sophisticated language tools like ChatGPT, that are going to pose a challenge to speech governance. Yet, legal and policy measures have not responded adequately to AI tools becoming more dynamic and impactful. In order to address the challenges posed by algorithmic content governance, I argue that there is a need to frame a regulatory approach that focuses on the tools used in both content moderation and content generation contexts—which can be done by viewing this technology through an algorithmic accountability lens. I provide an overview of the various aspects of the technical and normative features of these tools that help us frame the regulation of these tools as an algorithmic accountability issue. I do this in three steps: First, I discuss the lack of sufficient attention towards AI tools in current regulatory approaches. Second, I highlight the shared features of both content moderation and content generation to offer insights about the interlinked and evolving landscape of online speech and AI Governance. Third, I situate this discussion of speech governance within a broader framework of algorithmic accountability to guide future regulatory interventions.
December 27, 2023
Volume 99
R. George Wright
Some Supreme Court cases amount, at their best, to missed opportunities. The Supreme Court’s recent case Counterman v. Colorado resolved, quite dubiously, one particular issue of mens rea. In the course of doing so, however, the Court ignored a variety of clearly presented issues of even greater significance.
Full article available here.
November 21, 2023
Volume 99
Charles M. Lamb & Jacob R. Neiheisel
This article spotlights how University of Chicago Professor David Strauss’s publications present the early stages of a descriptive theory of constitutional interpretation and evolution, and how his theoretical contributions might be strengthened. Specifically highlighted here are ten milestone Supreme Court rulings with the objective of determining which were “evolutionary” as opposed to “modernizing,” based on Strauss’s theoretical formulations. On various occasions these cases demonstrate how Strauss’s theory can be not only refined but broadened. The concluding section assesses Strauss’s contribution to the study of American constitutional development and how it might be revamped. There we argue that despite Strauss’s influence on the study of the Supreme Court and constitutional evolution, he relies on concepts that must be clarified and honed for future research, and he must make his theory more comprehensive. At a minimum, Strauss should extend his descriptive theory to three types of Supreme Court decisions: those that are retrogressive, revolutionary, and confirming status quo in nature. Finally, Strauss should attempt the most difficult task of all: developing a causal theory of constitutional change.