Evading Constitutional Challenge: DAPA’s Implications for Future Exercises of Executive Enforcement Discretion

Lucy Chauvin

This Note focuses on how President Trump and future presidents generally can achieve deferred-action-related goals without transgressing the boundaries of permissible enforcement discretion. Part I discusses United States v. Texas and addresses the specific challenge brought to President Obama’s immigration policy as well as scholarly arguments regarding DAPA’s constitutionality. Part II identifies the constitutional source of authority for enforcement discretion and explores interplay between the executive’s somewhat conflicting duties under the Take Care Clause. Part III looks at the development of enforcement discretion over time and specifically within the context of immigration law. Part IV focuses on the historically limited role of the judiciary in this area of the law. Lastly, Part V addresses how President Trump can move forward with implementing his own immigration policy without running into the same constitutional roadblocks that his predecessor faced.

Full article available here.